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Laval théologique et philosophique, 42,1 (février 1986) 
ST. ANSELM ON DIVINE 
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FUTURE 
CONTINGENCY 
William L. CRAIG 
RÉSUMÉ. — Procédant à une lecture attentive du De concordia praescientiae et 
praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, l'auteur veut mettre en 
lumière la contribution trop souvent méconnue de saint Anselme de Cantorbery 
à l'étude du difficile problème de l'accord entre la prescience divine et le libre 
arbitre humain. 
CONTEMPORARY discussions of foreknowledge and future contingency have all but completely overlooked the contributions of Anselm of Canterbury on 
this score, despite that fact that his treatise. De concordia praescientiae praedestina-
tionis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio (1107/08) contains a very interesting and 
illuminating discussion of the problem of theological fatalism. That work is divided 
into three sections, dealing respectively with the harmony of foreknowledge, of 
predestination, and of grace with human freedom of the will. In the first section, 
which will be the focus of our interest, Anselm draws upon the analyses of both 
Augustine and Boethius to present a multi-faceted solution to the alleged incompati-
bility of God's foreknowledge and man's free choice. 
Compatibility of Foreknowledge and Freedom 
Admittedly, he begins, these two do seem to be incompatible : "for it is necessary 
that the things foreknown by God be going to occur, whereas the things done by free 
choice occur without any necessity." l Anselm's procedure therefore is to assume that 
1. ANSELM, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio 1.1 (All 
citations of Anselm's works are from the Hopkins and Richardson translation, Anselm of Canterbury, 
4 vols. (New York: 1947). "... quoniam ea quae deus praescit, necesse est esse futura, et quae per 
liberum arbitrium fiunt, nulla necessitate proveniunt." The text used throughout is that of Franciscus 
Salesius Schmitt, ed. S. Anselmi Opera omnia, 6 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : Friedrich Fromman 
Verlag, 1968). 
93 
WILLIAM L. CRAIG 
both are the case and to try to derive therefrom an impossibility. This, he thinks, 
cannot be done: 
Now, on the assumption that some action is going to occur without necessity, 
God foreknows this, since He foreknows all future events. And that which is 
foreknown by God is, necessarily, going to occur, as is foreknown. Therefore, it 
is necessary that something is going to occur without necessity. Hence, the 
foreknowledge from which necessity follows and the freedom of choice from 
which necessity is absent are here seen (for one who rightly understands it) to be 
not at all incompatible.2 
Anselm's reasoning obviously derives from Augustine. He does not yet clearly 
distinguish, as he will, between precedent and subsequent necessity. The point is 
rather that God's foreknowledge makes it necessary that a contingent event occur. 
Therefore, God's foreknowledge actually secures man's freedom rather than annuls 
it.3 
But someone will object that God foreknows that I shall sin or He foreknows 
that I shall not sin. So if I sin, it is necessary that I sin, and if I do not, then it is 
necessary that I do not. Again the Augustinian context of the problem is apparent.4 
Anselm replies that his opponent should have said, "God foreknows that it is without 
necessity that I shall sin" or "God foreknows that it is without necessity that I shall 
not sin." It follows that whether one sins or not, he does so without necessity. Thus, 
the necessity which accompanies foreknowledge is not incompatible with freedom of 
choice, whereby many actions are performed without necessity. 
But the objector may persist : if it is necessary that I sin willingly (ex voluntate), 
then, since necessity implies either coercion (coactio) or restraint (prohibitio), I am 
compelled by some hidden power to sin; and if I do not sin, then I am restrained 
from willing to sin. So if I sin, I do so by necessity, and if I do not, it is also by 
2. Ibid. 1.1. 
"Sed si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui praescit omnia futura. Quod 
autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est, sicut praescitur. Necesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum 
sine necessitate. Nequaquam ergo recte intelligenti hie repugnare videntur praescientia quam sequitur 
nécessitas, et libertas arbitrii a qua removetur nécessitas..." 
3. Anselm's solution seems misunderstood by Paul A. Streveler, "Anselm on Future Contingencies: A 
Critical Analysis of the Argument of the De concordia" Anselm Studies 1 (1983): 170, who mistakenly 
infers that "I will sin freely at /," means "I will sin at /, or I will not sin at /," which is tautologically 
true. 
4. This is interesting because Anselm denied that freedom of choice is the ability to sin and not to sin. 
For then neither God nor the elect angels would have free choice. But we must have a concept of 
freedom that is univocal for God and creatures. That concept is the ability to keep uprightness of will 
for its own sake. Thus, Satan and Adam both sinned by their own choice, which was free ; but neither 
sinned by means of that in virtue of which his choice was free. Moreover, after the Fall, man still has 
this ability, though he is a slave of sin. For although he never has the ability to possess uprightness 
when he does not have it, it remains true of fallen man that when he does have uprightness, he has the 
ability to keep it. Just as when the sun is behind a cloud we say that a man has the ability to see the 
sun, so when uprightness of will is absent we may say that man is able to keep uprightness of will for 
its own sake. For a man has the eyes to see the sun when it is present, and he has understanding and 
will by which he may keep uprightness when he has it. (ANSELM, De libertate arbitrii.) This peculiar 
concept of freedom, however, plays little role in Anselm's discussion of foreknowledge and human 
freedom. See also ANSELM, De concordia 3.3-5. 
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necessity. This objection seems obviously aimed at the Augustinian account of free 
will and necessity, according to which free choice and compulsion are incompatible. 
The objector is a sort of compatibilist who thinks that my sinning voluntarily and 
under hidden compulsion are not incompatible. Augustine in De libero arbitrio would 
have rejected the idea that a decision of the will could be voluntary and yet somehow 
compelled. Indeed, the will cannot be compelled to do anything. Anselm agrees.5 
Both men reject the inference from "It is necessary that I sin willingly" to "I am 
secretly compelled to sin willingly." Clearly, therefore, Anselm must be interpreting 
the necessity wrought by God's foreknowledge of a future contingent as something 
other than coercion or restraint. This is in fact the case.6 According to Anselm, 
something may be necessary without compulsion's being involved. For example, 
when we say, "It is necessary for God to be immortal" we do not mean something 
compels God to be immortal. Rather we mean nothing can cause Him not to be 
immortal. Anselm elsewhere explains further the distinction between a necessity 
which compels and a necessity which does not compel.7 When we say in God's case 
that something is necessary, we mean that in all other things there is a necessity which 
prevents them from doing — and compels them not to do — anything contrary to 
that which is being said of God. "For example, when we say 'It is necessary that God 
always speak the truth' and 'It is necessary that God never tell a lie,' nothing else is 
meant except that in God the steadfastness for maintaining the truth is so great that it 
is necessary that no thing can cause Him not to speak the truth or can cause Him to 
tell a lie."8 The point is reminiscent of Augustine's distinction in De civitate Dei 5.10, 
except that Anselm seems to interpret the necessity of essential predication in terms 
of a sort of inverse causal impossibility ; that is to say, when a property belongs 
necessarily to some substance, this is taken to mean that nothing can cause that 
substance to lack that property. Now applied to the problem of theological fatalism, 
this means that when I say "It is necessary that you will sin voluntarily," this does not 
imply that something prevents the act of will to not-sin or compels the act of will to 
sin.9 God foreknows that the act of will is neither compelled nor prevented by 
anything. Hence, Anselm concludes, what is done voluntarily is done freely. 
This account, while clearly non-compatibilist, does not, however, explain much. 
On the above analysis, "It is necessary that you will sin voluntarily" would seem to 
be equivalent to "Nothing can cause you not to sin voluntarily." That is to say, 
lettingp stand for "You will sin voluntarily," Dp = nothing can bring it about that 
p. The problem is, this still appears to be fatalistic. For it seems obvious that 
something could bring it about that p ; for example, I could kill you prior to your 
willing to sin. In saying that if God foreknows p, then nothing can cause p to be the 
5. ANSELM, De libertaie arbitrii 5-8. 
6. ANSELM, De concordia 1.2. For a brief discussion of Anselm's modalities see Desmond Paul HENRY, 
The Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford : Clarendon, 1967), pp. 172-9. 
7. ANSELM, Cur Deus homo 2.17 ; cf. Philosophical Fragments 24.16-25. 
8. ANSELM, Cur Deus homo 2.17. "Nam cum dicimus quia necesse est deum semper verum dicere, et 
necesse est eum numquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud nisi quia tanta est in illo constantia servandi 
veritatem, ut necesse sit nullam rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat aut ut mentiatur." 
9. ANSELM, De concordia 1.2. 
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case, Anselm does not, therefore, seem to have escaped fatalism. Perhaps, however, 
this is pressing Anselm's analogy too far. It may be only that Anselm wished to assert 
that the notion of necessity does not always involve compulsion and that the 
necessity of essential predication is an example of this. Similarly, the necessity 
wrought by foreknowledge involves neither compulsion nor restraint ; but Anselm 
may not thereby mean that the same analysis in terms of inverse causal impossibility 
may be applied to it. 
Precedent and Subsequent Necessity 
Distinction Between Precedent and Subsequent Necessity 
Indeed, he proceeds to provide a rather Boethian analysis of the necessity 
involved in God's foreknowledge in terms of precedent and subsequent necessity.10 
He writes, 
Indeed, (if someone properly considers the word), by the very fact that 
something is said to be foreknown, it is declared to be going to occur. For only 
what is going to occur is foreknown, since knowledge is only of the truth. 
Therefore, when I say "If God foreknows something, it is necessary that this 
thing be going to occur," it is as if I were to say : "If this thing will occur, of 
necessity it will occur." But this necessity neither compels nor prevents a thing's 
existence or nonexistence... For when I say "If it will occur, of necessity it will 
occur," here the necessity follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence 
of the thing. The sense is the same if we say "What will be, of necessity will be." 
For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will occur will not be 
able not to occur at the same time.11 
On this analysis the proposition "If God foreknows something, necessarily this thing 
will occur" is logically equivalent to the proposition "If this thing will occur, 
necessarily it will occur." Anselm thereby reduces the problem of theological fatalism 
to the original logical problem of fatalism. Equally important, he insists that the 
necessity here operative involves no compulsion or restraint, but ultimately reduces 
to logical necessity. For when we say that if an event will occur then necessarily it will 
occur, we do not mean that its opposite is unconditionally impossible ; rather granted 
that it will occur, it is then impossible for its opposite to happen, since two 
contradictory states of affairs cannot obtain in reality at the same time. For example, 
it is not the same thing, he claims, for a thing to be white as for a white thing to be 
white. A staff is not necessarily white, since before it was white it could be non-white, 
10. On the Boethian antecedents, see HENRY, Logic of Anselm, pp. 177-8; for a critical discussion see 
STREVELER, "Anselm on Future Contingencies," pp. 166-7. 
11. ANSELM, De concordia 1.2. 
"Denique si quis intellectum verbi proprie considérât: hoc ipso quod praesciri aliquid dicitur, 
futurum esse pronuntiatur. Non enim nisi quod futurum est praescitur, quia scientia non est nisi 
veritatis. Quare cum dico quia si praescit deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum : idem est ac si 
dicam : Si erit, ex necessitate erit. Sed haec nécessitas nee cogit nee prohibet aliquid esse aut non esse... 
Nam cum dico: si erit, ex necessitate erit: hic sequitur nécessitas rei positionem, non praecedit. Idem 
valet, si sic pronuntietur : Quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud significat haec nécessitas, nisi 
quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse." 
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and after it is white it is able to become non-white. But it is necessary that a white 
thing always be white. For it cannot happen that a white thing is at the same time 
not-white. Similarly, it is not necessary that a thing be temporally present ; but it is 
necessary that a present thing be always present, since a present thing is not able at 
the same time to be not-present. Hence, the proposition "If the event will occur, of 
necessity it will occur" is logically equivalent to "What will be, of necessity will be," 
which in Anselm's analysis means that it is an analytic and hence necessary truth that 
"What will be will be." Anselm thereby implies that the future cannot be changed, 
for by definition the future is what will be. This is not fatalistic because the necessity 
of this statement is that of a tautology.12 Necessarily, what will be will be; but this 
involves no precedent necessity which determines the content of what will be. 
Elsewhere Anselm analyzes the notion of precedent necessity in terms of causal 
necessity.13 A true prophecy, he states, does not make the predicted event happen. 
The proposition "It was necessary that the event happen because the prophecy about 
it was true" is logically equivalent to "It was necessary that the event happen in this 
manner because it was going to happen in this manner." Anselm explains that this 
kind of necessity does not compel a thing to be ; rather the being of the thing makes 
ifacit) the necessity to be. There is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a 
thing's being the case ; but there is also a necessity which succeeds and which is made 
by the thing. An example of the former is the necessity which efficiently causes the 
heavens to revolve. An example of the latter is the necessity involved in saying 
"Because you are speaking, you are of necessity speaking" — here the necessity does 
not cause anything but is rather itself made. "For when I make this statement, I 
signify that nothing can cause it to be the case that while you are speaking you are not 
speaking ; I do not signify that anything is compelling you to speak." 14 Now 
wherever there is precedent necessity, there is subsequent necessity ; but the converse 
does not hold. For example, we may assert, "Because the heavens are revolving, 
necessarily they are revolving," but we may not say, "You are speaking because it is 
necessary for you to speak." On Anselm's analysis, then, precedent necessity seems to 
be unconditional causal necessity, while subsequent necessity is conditional, logical 
necessity. It is, however, interesting that he seems to reintroduce his analysis of 
subsequent necessity in terms of inverse causation : in "Because you are speaking, 
necessarily you are speaking," the necessity is said to mean that nothing can cause the 
consequent to be false if the antecedent is true, for then the law of contradiction 
would be violated. This understanding does not entail the fatalism that his earlier 
implied formulation did. At the same time, it is evident how foreign such an analysis 
of necessity is to modern logical theory.15 
12. On this see Léon BAUDRY, "La prescience divine chez S. Anselme," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du Moyen-Âge 13 (1940-2): 228. 
13. ANSELM, Cur Deus homo 2.17'. —Not, as Henry states, physical necessity, since for Anselm causes may 
be non-physical. (HENRY, Logic of Anselm, p. 173.) 
14. Ibid. "Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse, ut dum loqueris non loquaris, non quod aliquid 
ti cogat ad loquendum." 
15. See comments by HENRY, Logic of Anselm, p. 179, who nevertheless overlooks Anselm's curious 
analysis of subsequent necessity in terms of inverse causal impossibility. Streveler remarks, "It seems 
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Now subsequent necessity furnishes the key to unlock the problem of fatalism 
posed by Aristotle : 
Subsequent necessity applies to all tenses, in the following manner : Whatever 
has been, necessarily has been ; whatever is, necessarily is and necessarily was 
going to be. This is the necessity which (when Aristotle deals with singular and 
future propositions) seems to deny that there are real alternatives and to affirm 
that all things occur of necessity. Since the faith (or the prophecy) concerning 
Christ was true faith (or true prophecy) because He was going to die of His own 
will and not by necessity : it was necessary — in terms of the necessity which is 
subsequent and which does not efficiently cause anything — that His death 
would occur voluntarily... for because these things were going to occur, 
necessarily they did occur; and because they occurred, necessarily they were 
going to occur; and because they occurred, necessarily they occurred.16 
Here Anselm explicitly breaks with Aristotle (and Boethius) in affirming that future 
contingent singular propositions are true or false.17 For he states not only that 
"Whatever is, necessarily is," but also "Whatever is, necessarily was going to be," 
which Aristotle could not admit. These statements are not fatalistic because the 
necessity follows from the fact that the thing in question will in fact be, but there is no 
precedent necessity which compels the thing to be. Here Anselm supplements the 
Augustinian analysis of "It is necessary that x do y voluntarily" : the necessity here 
operative is now revealed to be subsequent necessity. Thus, because Christ would die 
voluntarily, necessarily He would die voluntarily. This changes the Augustinian 
solution entirely, for now the necessity is conditional. //"Christ will die voluntarily, 
necessarily He will die voluntarily. But the antecedent of this hypothetical is not 
causally determined, indeed it cannot be, given Anselm's understanding of "volun-
tary." Therefore, the consequent is not unconditionally necessary either ; it is 
necessary only if the antecedent is true, and nothing compels the antecedent to be 
true.18 Hence, both of the following statements are true : 19 
curious to me that Anselm should define subsequent necessity in terms of the lack of any power able to 
bring about the denial of the sentence said to be subsequently necessary. For, it seems quite 
superfluous to note that, in addition to not-P being self contradictory, there exists no power able to 
bring it about that it is true." (STREVELER, "Anselm on Future Contingencies," pp. 166-7) 
16. Ibid. 
"Ista sequens nécessitas currit per omnia tempora hoc modo: Quidquid fuit, necesse est fuisse. 
Quidquid est, necesse est esse et necesse est futurum fuisse. Quidquid futurum est, necesse est futurum 
esse. Haec est ilia nécessitas quae, ubi tractât ARISTOTELES de propositionibus singularibus et 
futuris, videtur utrumlibet distruere et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere. Hac sequenti et nihil 
efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera fuit fides vel prophetia de Christo, quia ex voluntate non ex 
necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit ut sic esset... Ideo enim necessitate fuerunt, quia futura erant ; 
et futura erant, quia fuerunt ; et fuerunt, quia fuerunt." 
17. Cf. ANSELM, Monologion 10; idem, De veritate 10; see also BAUDRY, "Prescience," pp. 233-6. 
18. We would today say that the modal operator governs the dictum as a whole; but Anselm does not 
appear to see this. For him the consequent is necessary, but only conditionally so, in a tautologous 
and hence vacuous way. As Henry notes, later medievals would doubtless understand his distinction 
as that between nécessitas consequentiae and nécessitas consequents. (HENRY, Logic of Anselm, p. 179 ; 
so also STREVELER, "Anselm on future contingencies," pp. 165-171. 
19. ANSELM, De concordia 1.2. 
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1. Something did exist and does exist and will exist, but not out of necessity. 
2. All that was, necessarily was ; all that is, necessarily is ; and all that will be, 
necessarily will be. 
This is so because (1) speaks of precedent and (2) of subsequent necessity. 
Contrast of the Past and the Future 
Anselm provides on this basis an interesting analysis of the necessity of the past 
and the future : 
In the same way, some event — e.g., an action — is going to occur without 
necessity, because before the action occurs, it can happen that it not be going to 
occur. On the other hand, it is necessary that a future event be future, because 
what is future is not able at the same time to be not future. Of the past it is 
similarly true (1) that some event is not necessarily past, because before it 
occurred, there was the possibility of its not occurring, and (2) that, necessarily, 
what is past is always past, since it is not able at the same time not to be past. 
Now a past event has a characteristic which a present event or a future event 
does not have. For it is never possible for a past event to become not-past, as a 
present event is able to become not-present and as an event which is not 
necessarily going to happen has the possibility of not happening in the future. 
Thus, when we say of what is going to happen that it is going to happen, this 
statement must be true, because it is never the case that what is going to happen 
is not going to happen. (Similarly, whenever we predicate something of itself, 
[the statement is true]. For when we say "Every man is a man," or "If he is a 
man, he is a man," or "Every white thing is white" or "If it is a white thing it is 
white" ; these statements must be true because something cannot both be and 
not be the case at the same time.) Indeed, if it were not necessary that everything 
which is going to happen were going to happen, then something which is going 
to happen would not be going to happen — a contradiction. Therefore, 
necessarily, everything which is going to happen is going to happen, and if it is 
going to happen, it is going to happen. (For we are saying of what is going to 
happen that it is going to happen.) But ["necessarily" here signifies] subsequent 
necessity, which does not compel anything to be.20 
In two respects the past and the future are on a modal par : events in the past and in 
the future alike may be causally contingent, and neither the past nor the future can be 
20. Ibid. 
"Eodem modo res aliqua — ut quaedam actio — non necessitate futura est, quia priusquam sit, fieri 
potest ut non sit futura ; rem vero futuram necesse est esse futuram, quoniam futurum nequit esse 
simul non futurum. De praeterito autem similiter verum est quia res aliqua non est necessitate 
praeterita, quoniam antequam esset, potuit fieri ut non esset ; et quia praeteritum semper necesse est 
praeteritum esse ; quoniam non potest simul non esse praeteritum. Sed in re praeterita est quiddam, 
quod non est in re praesenti vel futura. Numquam enim fieri potest, ut res quae praeterita est fiat non 
praeterita; sicut res quaedam quae praesens est potest fieri non praesens, et aliqua res quae non 
necessitate futura est potest fieru, ut non sit futura. Itaque cum dicitur futurum de futuro, necesse est 
esse quod dicitur, quia futurum numquam est non futurum, sicut quotiens idem dicimus de eodem. 
Cum enim dicimus quia omnis homo est homo; aut si est homo, homo est; aut omne album est 
album ; et si est album, album est ; necesse est esse quod dicitur, quia non potest aliquid simul esse et 
non esse. Quippe si non est necesse omne futurum esse futurum, quoddam futurum non est futurum, 
quod est impossible. Necessitate ergo omne futurum futurum est ; et si est futurum, futurum est, cum 
futurum dicitur de futuro ; sed necessitate sequente, quae nihil esse cogit." 
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changed, for it is tautologously true that what has been has been and what will be will 
be. Nonetheless, Anselm struggles to elucidate a sense in which the past is different 
from the future or the present. A past event is always past, while a present event may 
become non-present, presumably by receding into the past.21 On this parallel one 
would expect him to say that a future event may become non-future, by becoming 
present. Instead, he says that a future contingent event (res quae non necessitate futur a 
est) can either be or not be in the future. But in terms of precedent necessity, the 
parallel is true of past events, as we have seen ; and in terms of subsequent necessity it 
is contradictory to say a future contingent event will not be future.221 think that what 
Anselm is attempting to express is that the past is somehow actual in a sense in which 
the future is not. The events of the past were open to occurring or not, but are so no 
longer ; but the possibility remains open whether any event or its opposite will occur 
in the future. Thus in terms of precedent necessity the future is open, while the past is 
not. Thus, on Anselm's analysis neither the past nor the future can be changed, for 
this would land one in self-contradiction. But the necessity that characterized past 
and future alike is merely subsequent necessity : if a thing has been, necessarily it has 
been ; and if a thing will be, necessarily it will be. On the other hand, while the past is 
now causally isolated (denial of backward causation), nevertheless the future is 
causally open. The implication is that though the future is as unchangeable as the 
past, fatalism does not follow because we freely determine what it is that will be 
future. 
Application to Fatalism 
Anselm proceeds to underline the fact that though an event is going to occur, it 
is not always the case that it occurs by (causal) necessity.23 For example, the 
proposition "Tomorrow there will be an insurrection among the people" may be 
true, but it is not the case that the insurrection occurs by necessity. "For before it 
occurs, it is possible that it not occur even if it is going to occur." 24 Sometimes a 
future event will occur by necessity ; for example, that there be a sunrise tomorrow. 
The insurrection which is going to occur tomorrow is, necessarily, going to occur, but 
the sunrise which is going to occur tomorrow is going to occur by necessity. 
For if the insurrection is going to occur tomorrow, then — necessarily — it is 
going to occur. On the other hand, the sunrise is understood to be going to occur 
with two necessities: (1) with a preceding necessity, which causes the event to 
occur (for the event will occur because it is necessary that it occur), and (2) with 
21. Cf. ibid. 1.5 : "... temporally past things are never able not to be past. But all temporally present things 
which pass away do become not-present." ("... temporis praeterita non valent umquam praeterita non 
esse, praesentia vero tempore omnia quae transeunt fiunt non praesentia.") 
22. The difficulty here is also spotted by STREVELER, "Anselm on future contingencies," pp. 167-9, 
though his remarks on p. 168 strike me as an obscure and inaccurate interpretation of Anselm. 
23. ANSELM, De concordia 1.3. 
24. Ibid. "Potest enim fieri antequam sit, ut non fiat, etiam si est futura." 
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a subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to occur (for because 
the sunrise is going to occur, it is — necessarily — going to occur).25 
To draw the application to the problem at hand, when we say of an event foreknown 
by God that it is necessary that it be going to occur, we do not mean that it will occur 
by necessity ; rather we mean that an event which is going to occur is, necessarily, 
going to occur. When God foreknows future events, He foreknows that some of these 
things will happen contingently, for example, the free decisions of men. It is not 
necessary that these events take place, but if they are going to take place then God 
foreknows this, and, necessarily, they will take place. 
SUMMARY 
Thus, on Anselm's view neither God's foreknowledge nor the antecedent truth 
of future contingent singular propositions entails fatalism. Theological fatalism 
reduces to the problem of the antecedent truth of such propositions. But such 
propositions are true only if the events in question will occur. Whether they will 
occur is causally indeterminate; either the event or its opposite may possibly 
eventuate. One of the opposites will occur and that future-tense proposition 
corresponding to it is true. It is not, however, necessarily true, since its contradictory 
could have been true. Granted that it is true, then necessarily the event described will 
happen. This necessity is, however, conditional; it depends on which of the 
contingent events will be realized, and that is up to the free wills of the persons 
involved. Therefore, the antecedent truth of a future contingent singular proposition 
does not entail fatalism. Similarly, whatever God foreknows will, necessarily, come 
to pass ; but it is not necessary that God foreknow that any given contingent event 
come to pass. For since the event is causally indeterminate, either it or its opposite 
may eventuate, depending on the free decision involved. Some decision will be taken, 
and God foreknows what it will be; therefore, necessarily, that decision will be taken. 
But this necessity is entirely dependent on which decision will be freely taken, and it is 
still possible for either decision to be taken. 
God's Knowledge and Eternity 
Anselm emphasizes that this solution is not dependent upon whether one 
ascribes to God timeless eternity or merely everlasting temporal duration.26 Drawing 
once more upon Augustine, he warns that if God's knowledge or foreknowledge 
imposes necessity upon everything He knows or foreknows, then, since He knows 
what He wills and causes and He foreknows what He shall will and cause, He does 
not freely will or cause anything — rather He wills and causes everything by 
necessity, which, Anselm snaps, is absurd. Hence, we must say for any given future 
25. Ibid. 
"Si enim eras futura est, necessitate futura est. Ortus vero solis duabus necessitatibus futurus 
intelligitur, scilicet et praecedenti quae facit rem esse — ideo enim erit, quia necesse est ut sit —, et 
sequenti quae nihil cogit esse, quoniam idcirco necessitate futurus est, quia futurus est." 
26. Ibid. 1.4. 
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contingent both that it is not compelled to occur by any necessity and that, 
necessarily, it will occur (because it is going to occur). 
Although the notion of God's eternity does not, as we have seen, play a part in 
Anselm's initial foray against theological fatalism, when the relationship between 
foreknowledge and predestination arises, he does turn to the concept of God's 
timelessness in order to frame his discussion.27 According to Anselm, many people 
were lamenting because they believed that free choice was of no avail for salvation or 
condemnation, but that as a result of God's foreknowledge only necessity determined 
one's salvation or damnation.28 Anselm wants to hold to both free choice and 
predestination. He argues that what is immutable in God's timeless eternity is 
changeable in time prior to its occurrence, by a free act of the will. In Anselm's 
understanding God transcends both space and time, so that it may be said of Him 
that He exists in no place at no time.29 God does not experience temporal succession 
and therefore has neither past nor future. "Does none of Your eternity pass by so 
that it no longer is, and is none of it going to become what, so to speak, it not yet is ?" 
asks Anselm : "Then in no case were You yesterday or will You be tomorrow ; 
instead, yesterday, today, and tomorrow You are. Or better, You simply are — 
existing beyond all time." 30 God has only a present. But, Anselm cautions, this is not 
a temporal present, but an eternal present in which the whole of time is contained.31 
He explains that what transcends space and time is not restricted by the law of space 
and time, namely, that whatever is in space and time is subject to division into parts, 
for example, past, present, and future.32 Since God is not so temporally restricted, He 
is not prevented from being present as a whole to all times. 
Therefore, since an inescapable necessity demands that the Supreme Being be 
present as a whole in every place and at every time, and since no law of space or 
time prohibits the Supreme Being from being present as a whole in every place at 
once or from being present as a whole at every time at once, the Supreme Being 
must be present as a whole in every different place at once and present as a whole 
at every different time at once. Its being present at one place or time does not 
prevent it from being simultaneously and similarly present at another place or 
time.33 
God is, strictly speaking, not, therefore, in every place and time, but is with every 
place and time. Therefore, God's acts of foreknowing, predestining, calling, and 
27. Ibid. 1.5. 
28. Ibid. 1.6. 
29. ANSELM, Monologion 21-2 ; idem Proslogion 19. 
30. ANSELM, Prologion 19. "An de aeternitate tua nihil praeterit ut iam non sit, nee aliquid futurum est 
quasi nondum sit? Non ergo fuisti heri aut eris eras, sed heri et hodie et eras es. Immo nee heri nee 
hodie nee eras es, sed simpliciter es extra omne tempus." 
31. ANSELM, De concordia 1.5. 
32. ANSELM, Monologion 22. 
33. Ibid. 
"Quare quoniam summam essentiam totam et inevitabilis nécessitas exigit nulli loco vel tempori 
déesse, et nulla ratio loci aut temporis prohibet omni loco vel tempori simul totam adesse : necesse est 
earn simul totam omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus praesentem esse. Non enim quia huic loco vel 
tempori praesens est, idcirco prohibitur illi vel illi loco aut tempori simul et similiter praesens esse." 
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justifying men at different points in time and space take place in His timeless 
eternity.34 For Anselm this presence of God to all times seems to be not merely 
epistemic, but real ; that is to say, it is not just that God in His timeless eternity knows 
the content of the entire temporal process, but that that process as a whole — past, 
present, and future — is itself present to God : 
... I am not saying that my action of tomorrow at no time exists; I am merely 
denying that it exists today, even though it always exists in eternity. And when 
we deny that something which is past or future in the temporal order is past or 
future in eternity, we do not maintain that that which is past or future does not 
in any way exist in eternity ; instead, we are simply saying that what exists there 
unceasingly in its eternal-present mode does not exist there in the past or future 
mode... [In eternity] there is no time before it exists or after it exists ; instead it 
exists unceasingly, because in eternity nothing exists temporally.35 
Although Anselm's statements concerning the flow of time appear to be inconsistent 
with this view, we seem to have here a remarkable anticipation of the widely held 
modern theory of the universe as a "block" of space-time itself subsisting timelessly 
as a whole. Future events do not yet exist in the sense that they do not exist at the 
present time ; but they do exist at their own times, and all events exist timelessly in 
eternity, where God beholds them. While from our perspective within the temporal 
series, a future event is mutable because it is determined by our freely chosen actions, 
still from God's timeless perspective everything within the temporal series is static 
and immutable.36 From our point of view, it appears that God foreknows and 
predestines men's future choices, but from His vantage point, He simply knows what 
the men in the temporal series are choosing and His "predestination" consists simply 
in leaving the will to its own power and concurring in its choice.37 Therefore, just as 
/Acknowledge is not properly found in God, neither is predestination. Thus, once 
again foreknowledge is seen not to be inconsistent with free choice. 
Anselm, then, has at least two arguments against theological fatalism. First, the 
subsequent necessity which results from God's foreknowing the future is in no sense 
incompatible with contingency and free choice. Second, because God exists timelessly 
and is therefore present to all times, He strictly speaking does not foreknow anything, 
but simply knows what men freely choose. 
34. ANSELM, De concordia 1.5. 
35. Ibid. 
"Non enim dico actionem meam crastinam nullo tempore esse, sed hodie tantum nego earn esse, quae 
tamen semper est in aeternitate. Et quando negamus fuisse vel futurum ibi esse aliquid, quod in 
tempore fuit aut erit, non asserimus id quod fuit aut erit nullo modo ibi esse ; sed tantum praeterito vel 
futuro modo dicimus non ibi esse, quod ibi indesinenter est suo praesenti modo... non antequam sit 
vel postquam est, sed indesinenter, quia nihil est ibi secundum tempus." 
36. This serves to resolve the inconsistency alleged by STREVELER, "Anselm on future contingencies," 
pp. 169-70. Since the entire time-line of the univers subsists finelessly with God and temporal 
becoming is mind-dependant, God may know timelessly and immutably events which on the time-line 
are temporal and mutable. To say that an event is mutable in the eternal present means that on the 
time line it is causally contingent vis à vis its proximate causes and, therefore, were these to act 
differently, some other event would be eternally present. Modern defenders of the B-theory of time 
have, I think, successfully rebutted charges of determinism or fatalism. 
37. ANSELM, De concordia 2.3. 
103 
WILLIAM L. CRAIG 
Relation of God's Knowledge to the Object Known 
There is, however, one final aspect of Anselm's thought that would seem to be 
nettlesome for the theological libertarian.38 This is the issue of the relation between 
God's knowledge and the objects of God's knowledge. Boethius expressed misgivings 
with the Origenist view that the objects of knowledge determine the content of what 
God knows. Now Anselm considers "whether His knowledge derives from things or 
whether things derive their existence from His knowledge." 39 He is confronted with 
the dilemma: 
... if God derives His knowledge from things, it follows that they exist prior to 
His knowledge and hence do not derive their existence from Him ; for they can 
only exist from Him in accordance with His knowledge. On the other hand, if all 
existing things derive their existence from God's knowledge, God is the Creator 
and the author of evil works and hence is unjust in punishing evil creatures — a 
view we do not accept.40 
Anselm's problem with the view that God's knowledge derives from things is that the 
things would thereby become ontologically independent of God. This seems exceed-
ingly odd, for the priority of such objects to God's knowledge is not metaphysical, 
but epistemic. He knows them to be as they are because they in fact are as they are. 
But Anselm seems to think this pasts doubt on God's creative activity. For things are 
as they are because God created them as they are. But if God created them as they are 
apart from His knowledge of them, then His creation was blind and unknowing, 
which is impossible. Since God creates in accordance with His knowledge, to say that 
God's knowledge derives from the object is to imply that the object was uncreated by 
God. At least this may have been Anselm's fear ; his comments are too terse to be 
certain. Therefore, he thinks that in some unexplained sense, God's knowledge of 
objects itself causes those objects to exist. Now he rightly sees that this causes 
difficulty concerning the origin of evil ; but perhaps he does not fully appreciate how 
fatalistic this must also appear. For now God's foreknowledge causally determines 
the future and the temporal series is caused by His timeless knowledge. Hence, even if 
Anselm's escape from the dilemma, in terms of the Augustinian view of evsil as a 
privation and hence something not caused by God, is successful, it is still not clear 
that he has escaped fatalism, or more correctly, determinism. For the good acts of 
will are determined to be what they are because God causes them to be that way, by 
knowing them into existence, so to speak. This difficulty was to elicit a great deal of 
thought on the part of Thomas Aquinas and helped to spawn the debate between 
subsequent generations of Thomists and Molinists over the notion of divine "middle 
knowledge" (scientia media). 
38. See the struggles of BAUDRY, "Prescience," pp. 229-31; also STREVELER, "Anselm on future 
contingencies," p. 170, though once we understand Anselm as a B-theorist, his difficulties concerning 
priority in the eternal present vanish, since this is a causal, not a temporal priority. 
39. Ibid 1.7. "utrum eius scientia sit a rebus, an res habeant esse ab eides scientia." 
40. Ibid 
"Nam si deus a rebus habet scientiam, sequitur quod illae prius sint quam eius scientia, et sic a deo 
non sint, a quo nequeunt esse nisi per eius scientiam. Si vero quaecumque sunt a scientia dei sumunt 
essentiam, deus est factor et auctor malorum operum, et ideo non iuste punit malos; quod non 
suscipimus." 
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